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An Unexpected Breakthrough in 
Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform
?
Albert H. Y. Chen*
In a previous comment published in this Journal,1 I have introduced 
readers to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) 
Government’s Consultation Document on Methods for Selecting the Chief 
Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012 published on 
18 November 2009. The present comment updates readers on devel-
opments since then, particularly the unexpected turn of events in the 
week of 14–20 June 2010 which led to the Government’s constitutional 
reform proposals being passed by the Legislative Council (LegCo) of the 
HKSAR on 24 and 25 June 2010.2 
As mentioned in my previous comment, the “pan-democrats” 
(including the Democratic Party (DP), the Civic Party (CP), the League 
of Social Democrats (LSD), the Association for Democracy and Peo-
ple’s Livelihood (ADPL) and their allies, which occupied 23 seats in the 
60-seat LegCo) – who had the power to veto any constitutional reform 
package in the form of amendments to Annexes I and II to the Basic Law 
which require a two-thirds majority in LegCo – were opposed to the pro-
posal in the Consultation Document. Nevertheless, after considering the 
views of members of the public collected during the three-month con-
sultation period for the Consultation Document, the Government on 
14 April 2010 formally announced its Package of Proposals for the Methods 
for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 
20123 – a constitutional reform proposal (“the Reform Package”) that is 
basically the same as that proposed in the Consultation Document. The 
motions for the relevant amendments to Annexes I and II of the Basic 
Law for the purpose of implementing the Reform Package were formally 
submitted to LegCo on 7 June 2010 for debate and voting on 23 June 
2010. 
The reasons for the pan-democrats’ opposition to the Reform Pack-
age have been documented in my previous comment. It is noteworthy, 
however, that as from autumn 2009, the pan-democrats became split 
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1 Albert H. Y. Chen, “Constitutional Developments in Autumn 2009” (2009) 39 HKLJ 751.
2 The facts mentioned in this comment have been reported in Hong Kong newspapers; footnote 
references will not be supplied here except where strictly necessary. 
3 See www.cmab-cd2012.gov.hk. 
COMMENT
Article_4.indd   259 9/16/2010   5:53:21 PM
260 Albert H. Y. Chen (2010) HKLJ
into two camps (the “moderate” and “radical” camps) which adopted 
different approaches or strategies in their struggle for democratisation 
in the HKSAR. The “radical” camp, consisting of the CP and LSD, 
engaged in the “referendum” campaign to gather mass support for 
democratisation and the abolition of functional constituencies.4 The 
“moderate” camp, led by the DP which cooperated with some pro-
democracy groups, politicians and scholars in forming the Alliance for 
Universal Suffrage,5 sought to work out concrete demands and propos-
als and negotiate with the HKSAR Government and Beijing.6 
Despite a statement from the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Offi ce of 
the State Council in Beijing7 that the “referendum” advocated by the CP 
and LSD would be inconsistent with Hong Kong’s constitutional status 
and contrary to the Basic Law, the CP and LSD on 21 January 2010 for-
mally launched the campaign of fi ve of their LegCo members resigning 
so as to trigger what they promoted as a de facto referendum in each of 
the fi ve geographical constituencies for LegCo elections in the HKSAR 
on the introduction of genuine universal suffrage (for the election of 
the Chief Executive and all legislators) and abolition of functional con-
stituencies for LegCo elections. The resignations were tendered in the 
following week, and the by-election to fi ll the resulting vacancies in 
LegCo was held on 16 May 2010. The pro-Government political parties 
and groups boycotted the election, although some candidates with no 
backing from major political parties and groups participated in it. The 
resigned legislators were all returned to LegCo. The voter turnout rate 
was only 17.1 per cent,8 but the CP and LSD claimed success and pointed 
to the fact that half a million voters (ie 85 per cent of those who voted) 
had voted in support of their platform. 
Meanwhile, the DP and its allies in the Alliance for Universal Suffrage 
formulated various demands and hoped to persuade the HKSAR Gov-
ernment and Beijing to accept them in exchange for their support for the 
4 The strategy of pro-democracy legislators’ resignation from LegCo to trigger a de facto referen-
dum on democratisation was fi rst announced by the CP on 6 Sept 2009. 
5 The Alliance (also translated as the “Alliance for Ultimate Universal Suffrage”) was formed on 
24 Jan 2010. See the Alliance’s website www.universalsuffrage.hk, which provides, inter alia, the 
text of its “Proposal on the Road Map to Universal Suffrage” (dated 29 Mar 2010), http://www.
universalsuffrage.hk/?p=25&lang=en (last visited 22 July 2010).
6 On 8 July 2010, the Democratic Party published its report (in Chinese) on the history of 
its negotiations with the HKSAR Government and Beijing on political reform in 2010. See 
http://www.dphk.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/fullreport_6ppl2.pdf (last visited 22 July 
2010): “The Report of the Democratic Party’s Six-Person Working Group on Political 
Reform” (政改六人工作小組報告). The report provides details of the positions taken by the 
Party before and at different points in time of the negotiations. 
7 The statement was made on 15 Jan 2010 and reported in Hong Kong newspapers on 16 Jan. 
8 In the LegCo election of 2008, the voter turnout rate was 45.2%.
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Government’s constitutional reform proposal. Such demands included, 
inter alia, Beijing’s clarifi cation that the “universal suffrage” promised in 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) Deci-
sion of 20079 is genuine universal suffrage conforming to internationally 
recognised principles of universality and equality in the electoral sys-
tem, the nomination “threshold”10 for the candidates for the election of 
the Chief Executive (CE) by universal suffrage in 2017 being no higher 
than the existing nomination threshold for the election of the CE by the 
Election Committee, the abolition of functional constituencies by the 
time universal suffrage is introduced for the election of all legislators (in 
2010), the adoption of an electoral model for the election of LegCo in 
2010, the improvement of the Government’s Reform Package to include 
more democratic elements (eg increasing the newly introduced LegCo 
seats from 10 to 20; or, instead of elected District Councillors electing 
5 additional LegCo seats as proposed in the Reform Package, the addi-
tional seats should be elected by universal suffrage (by all voters except 
those already eligible to vote in existing functional constituencies) upon 
nomination by elected District Councillors), and the establishment of 
an institutionalised forum for discussion between the HKSAR Govern-
ment, Beijing and politicians in Hong Kong on issues of future constitu-
tional development in Hong Kong. 
Beijing adopted a strategy of differential treatment of the “moder-
ate” and “radical” camps of the pan-democrats in Hong Kong. Whereas 
it strongly condemned the “referendum” triggered by the resignation 
of CP and LSD legislators, it indicated its willingness to engage in a 
dialogue with the moderates, including the DP, the ADPL and the Alli-
ance for Universal Suffrage. Three widely publicised meetings were held 
between Mr Li Gang, Vice-Director of the Liaison Offi ce of the Central 
Government in the HKSAR and representatives of these three groups 
respectively on the week of 24 May 2010. In particular, the meeting 
with the DP leaders on 24 May was generally recognised as an important 
breakthrough or an “ice-breaking voyage” in the relationship between 
the DP and Beijing: Many of the founders and leaders of the DP had 
supported the student movement in Beijing in 1989, established the 
Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in 
China, and have continued to serve in the leadership of the Alliance 
since then. The Alliance organised annual demonstrations calling for 
the rehabilitation of the student movement and annual vigils to mourn 
9 See generally Albert H. Y. Chen, “A New Era in Hong Kong’s Constitutional History” (2008) 
38 HKLJ 1. 
10 See Art 45 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR.
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the victims of 4 June 1989. Since 1989, these Hong Kong political 
activists who subsequently formed the DP were regarded as anti-Beijing, 
and little offi cial communication existed between them and the Beijing 
Government. 
On 7 June 2010, the HKSAR Government submitted to LegCo the 
motion for implementing the Reform Package for debate and voting by 
LegCo before the end of June. The Government made no change to the 
Reform Package despite the pan-democrats’ opposition and their pub-
licly stated position that they would veto the motion. On the same day, 
Mr Qiao Xiaoyang, Vice-Secretary-General of the NPCSC and Chair-
man of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the NPCSC, made an 
important speech in which he attempted to respond to the demands of 
the DP and its allies. He pointed out that questions such as the nomina-
tion “threshold” for candidates for election of the CE by universal suf-
frage and the fate of functional constituencies as LegCo moves towards 
election of all legislators by universal suffrage could only be resolved by 
discussion in future.11 In the same speech, Mr Qiao acknowledged (for 
the fi rst time in a speech by a senior PRC offi cial)12 that “universal suf-
frage” implies universal and equal electoral rights.13 But he also pointed 
out that the international practice is that such rights may be subject to 
reasonable legal restrictions, and that in the case of Hong Kong, the 
future electoral system should be consistent with the legal status of the 
HKSAR and its executive-led political system, should take into account 
the interests of all social classes in Hong Kong, and should be condu-
cive to the development of Hong Kong’s capitalist economy. In his 
speech, Mr Qiao also commented on the DP’s proposal of letting the 
additional LegCo seats for the District Councils functional constituency 
be elected by all voters in Hong Kong (other than those who already 
have the right to vote in an existing functional constituency). He noted 
that some people had pointed out that this was a form of de facto or quasi 
11 In his earlier speech on 14 Apr 2010 (the day on which the HKSAR Government announced 
the Reform Package), Mr Qiao also referred to the fi ve-step procedure for constitutional reform 
in Hong Kong stipulated in the NPCSC’s Interpretation of 2004 (see generally Albert H. Y. 
Chen, “The Constitutional Controversy of Spring 2004” (2004) 34 HKLJ 215). According to 
this procedure, the precise electoral models for election of the CE by universal suffrage in 2017 
and the subsequent election of all legislators by universal suffrage can only be settled after the 
fi ve-step procedure has been initiated shortly before 2017 (in the case of the CE election in 
2017) and 2020 (in the case of the LegCo election in 2020) respectively. 
12 Months before Mr Qiao’s speech, the HKSAR Government had publicly stated that universal 
suffrage implies the principles of universality and equality, and that the existing mode of elec-
tions by functional constituencies of LegCo seats does not satisfy the requirement of universal 
suffrage. See, eg the speech of Mr Henry Ying-yen Tang, Chief Secretary, in introducing the 
Reform Package to LegCo on 14 Apr 2010.  
13 Mr Qiao, to the disappointment of the pan-democrats, did not address the question of the right 
to be  a candidate and the right to nominate a candidate. 
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direct election and might be inconsistent with the Basic Law and the 
NPCSC Decision of 2007 (which stipulates that in 2012, the existing 
50 per cent:50 per cent ratio of legislators elected by functional constitu-
encies and those elected by direct election in geographical constituen-
cies should remain unchanged). 
Given that the Government did not make any concessions by modi-
fying its Reform Package and Mr Qiao’s speech failed to satisfy the pan-
democrats, the scenario as of 7 June was that the motion for the Reform 
Package would be vetoed by the pan-democrats – a repetition of what 
happened in December 2005.14 To the surprise of most observers, the sit-
uation suddenly changed on 14 June 2010, when Mr Henry Tang, Chief 
Secretary of the HKSAR Government, met with Mr Albert Chun-yan 
Ho, DP Chairman, and asked him whether the DP would support the 
Government’s LegCo motion for constitutional reform if the Govern-
ment were to modify the Reform Package and accept the DP’s proposal 
regarding the fi ve additional District Councils functional constituency 
seats being elected (after candidates have been jointly nominated by 
elected District Councillors) by all voters in Hong Kong who do not 
already have the right to vote in any existing functional constituency 
(“the DP’s District Council electoral proposal”).15 The affi rmative answer 
given by Mr Ho proved to be crucial.16
On 17 June, the day of the TV debate between Chief Executive Donald 
Tsang and CP leader Ms Audrey Eu, Ms Elsie Leung, Vice-Chairman of 
the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the NPCSC, publicly expressed 
14 See generally Albert H. Y. Chen, “The Fate of the Constitutional Reform Proposal of October 
2005” (2005) 35 HKLJ 537. 
15 Approximately 200,000 persons have the right to vote in existing functional constituencies. 
According to the DP’s proposal, more than 3 million registered voters would be enfranchised 
with regard to the fi ve newly created LegCo functional constituency seats, and all voters in 
Hong Kong will have two votes – one in a geographical constituency, and one in a functional 
constituency. The Government’s Reform Proposal involves, inter alia, the creation of 10 addi-
tional seats in LegCo, 5 of which being elected by universal suffrage in geographical constitu-
encies, and 5 being elected by a new functional constituency consisting of elected District 
Councillors. 
16 Actually, speaking to the media on 13 June 2010, Mr Albert Ho already indicated that if the 
Government were to accept the DP’s District Council electoral proposal, he as DP Chairman 
would recommend to the DP that the DP should support the modifi ed constitutional reform 
package. He explained that at the beginning of the negotiations, it was not practicable to put 
forward this proposal as the Party’s only single demand, and other demands were therefore 
put forward together with it. See “Albert Ho: I would support the political reform if the Dis-
trict Council direct election proposal is accepted” (何俊仁：區會直選方案獲接納願挺政改), 
Hong Kong Economic Journal (信報財經新聞), 14 June 2010, p 10. It has also been reported 
that when the DP leaders met with Mr Li Gang on 24 May, the District Council electoral pro-
posal was particularly emphasised, although other demands were also put forward: see “Demo-
cratic Party: We will veto the political reform package if it is not changed” (民主黨：政改不
加碼即否决), “Five conditions set” (列五大條件), Ming Pao (明報), 25 May 2010, p A2.
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support for the DP’s District Council electoral proposal.17 In the next few 
days, there were various signs that this proposal had received the bless-
ings of the HKSAR Government as well as Beijing. On 21 June, Chief 
Executive Donald Tsang formally announced the Government’s accep-
tance of the proposal as a modifi cation to its original Reform Package. 
Mr Wong Yan-lung, Secretary for Justice, explained that the proposal is 
not inconsistent with the NPCSC Decision of 2007 regarding the ratio 
of legislators returned by functional constituencies and those elected by 
direct elections.18 
On 23 June, LegCo began its deliberations on the Government’s 
motions for amendment of Annexes I and II to the Basic Law. The 
motions19 themselves did not provide details regarding either the origi-
nal Reform Package or its modifi ed form after the Government accepted 
the DP’s District Council electoral proposal. The Government pointed 
out that such details could be and would be worked out at the level of 
17 Ms Leung subsequently disclosed that she had written to the Beijing authorities on 1 June 2010 
expressing her view that the electoral proposal is not inconsistent with the NPCSC Decision 
of 2007 and expressing support for the proposal. See her press statement dated 9 July 2010 (in 
Chinese), http://news.mingpao.com/20100710/gga2a_er.htm (last visited 10 July 2010). 
18 See his speech to the press at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201006/21/P201006210168.
htm (last visited 22 July 2010). Mr Wong stressed that according to the proposal, (unlike the 
case in the existing direct elections by universal suffrage in geographical constituencies) eligible 
voters (for the fi ve newly created functional constituency seats) exclude those already eligible 
to vote in existing functional constituencies; candidates (for election in the fi ve newly created 
functional constituency seats) must themselves be elected District Councillors and must be 
nominated by elected District Councillors. In my opinion, the issue of whether the proposal is 
inconsistent with the NPCSC Decision of 2007 may be approached as follows: The NPCSC 
Decision states that in 2012, the ratio of functionally elected legislators and those “directly 
elected in districts” should remain unchanged. If the DP’s proposal involves the election in an 
all-Hong Kong constituency (i.e. the whole of Hong Kong as one constituency) of fi ve legisla-
tors by proportional representation, then they are not “directly elected in districts”. The next 
question is whether they are functionally elected. This concerns how the concept of functional 
constituencies should be interpreted. The traditional conception of functional constituencies 
(as alluded to by Vice-Director Li Gang of the Liaison Offi ce when he spoke to the media on 
26 May 2010 – two days after he met with the DP) is that of representation of the interests of 
a particular trade, occupation, profession or sector. But there is nothing to prevent the Central 
Government and the HKSAR Government from adopting a more open, fl exible and creative 
interpretation of functional constituencies to allow the following functional constituency of a 
new type to be created: i.e. a new functional constituency consisting of all HK voters who are 
not already voters in any existing functional constituency – these HK voters (of this new func-
tional constituency) would vote for fi ve District Councillors to become LegCo members, who 
are jointly nominated by a certain number of District Councillors. This new functional con-
stituency can be understood as a functional constituency of a residuary category (i.e. consisting 
of voters who are not already voters in the existing functional constituencies) and of a mixed 
nature in the sense that it has features pertaining to both the residuary functional constituency 
mentioned above (ie all members of this residuary functional constituency having the right to 
vote in it) and the District Councils functional constituency (ie only elected District Council-
lors may nominate and be candidates in the election). If the matter is viewed in this way, then 
there is no inconsistency between the DP’s proposal and the NPCSC Decision.
19 The text of the motions was not new; it had been published together with the original Reform 
Package. 
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local legislation instead of in the amended Annexes to the Basic Law. 
At the LegCo meeting, the pan-democrats (including the DP) voted in 
support of a motion to postpone dealing with the Government’s motions 
on the ground that the Government had announced a major revision 
to the Reform Package only two days ago, and more time should be 
allowed for public discussion. The pan-democrats’ motion to postpone 
the matter was however defeated when voted on by the separate vot-
ing mechanism20 (the majority of the legislators elected from functional 
constituencies opposed the motion). LegCo then proceeded to debate 
and vote on the Government’s motions for amendment of Annexes I and 
II of the Basic Law. The motion for amendment of Annex I (regarding 
the electoral model for the CE in 2012) was passed by 46 to 13 votes on 
24 June, and that for amendment of Annex II (regarding the electoral 
model for LegCo in 2012) passed by 46 to 12 votes on 25 June. These 
were the fi rst amendments to the Basic Law enacted since the Basic Law 
came into effect in 1997. A major breakthrough in Hong Kong’s consti-
tutional reform was thus achieved. 
The pan-democrats were bitterly split on the DP’s District Council 
electoral proposal and on the DP’s vote in support of the Government’s 
motions to amend Annexes I and II of the Basic Law. The CP, LSD and 
four other pan-democrats opposed the DP’s stance and voted against the 
Government’s motions. Two of the nine DP legislators also opposed the 
DP’s position, and one of the two resigned from the DP in order to vote 
against the Government’s motions. The DP leadership and its supporters 
justifi ed acceptance of the Government’s modifi ed Reform Package by 
highlighting the progress in terms of democracy it achieved – 10 more 
seats would be added to LegCo in 2012, with 5 elected by universal suf-
frage and the other 5 elected by “quasi-universal suffrage”, with all vot-
ers having two votes (instead of the existing system of 200,000 voters 
having two votes and 3 million having only one). They also argued that 
the passage of the modifi ed Reform Package would pave the way for, 
and would in any event not be detrimental to, the eventual election of 
the CE and all legislators by universal suffrage. They pointed out that 
although the fi ve newly created “functional constituency” seats would be 
fi lled by elected District Councillors nominated by fellow District Coun-
cillors, their direct election by the people of Hong Kong would mean 
that they would be accountable to the people of Hong Kong instead of to 
narrow social sectors represented by existing functional constituencies. 
Opponents of the Government’s modifi ed Reform Package argued that it 
20 See s II (on the “procedures for voting on bills and motions in LegCo”) of Annex II to the Basic 
Law. 
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did nothing to pave the way for the abolition of functional constituen-
cies, and could not be considered progressive. They questioned whether 
acceptance of the package would only weaken the popular movement 
to strive for full democratisation in Hong Kong. They also pointed out 
that questions of the road map to and electoral models for eventual uni-
versal suffrage remain unresolved. Some of them even accused the DP of 
betraying the cause of democracy.  
Given that as a matter of political reality, the only alternative to accep-
tance of the Government’s modifi ed Reform Package was vetoing it (as 
the pan-democrats vetoed the 2005 reform package) and having another 
period of stagnation in Hong Kong’s political development until at least 
2016 (the time of the next LegCo election following the 2012 election 
covered by the Reform Package), the passage by the required two-thirds 
majority in LegCo of the resolutions for amendment of Annexes I and 
II should be welcomed. Some opponents of the modifi ed Reform Pack-
age have expressed the concern that the Package, in creating fi ve more 
functional constituency seats, would only perpetuate an unjust system 
and would be counterproductive in terms of the move towards universal 
suffrage. They also questioned whether the model (adopted in the modi-
fi ed Reform Package) of members of a functional constituency nominat-
ing their members for election by the populace may become in future a 
model for reforming and thus perpetuating other functional constituen-
cies, thus denying genuine universal suffrage. These are, however, ques-
tions for the future on which new political battles will be fought. The DP 
and other pan-democrats who supported the modifi ed Reform Package 
have made it clear that they will continue to fi ght in future for genuine 
universal suffrage and the abolition of functional constituencies. There 
is no confl ict between accepting the modifi ed Reform Package for 2012 
and continuing this fi ght in future. As for the modifi ed Reform Package 
itself, it should be recognised that although it is far from perfect, it is 
more democratic than the existing political system of Hong Kong. The 
creation in 2012 of additional functional constituency seats in LegCo at 
the same time as creating additional seats elected by universal suffrage 
is unavoidable given the constraints imposed by the NPCSC Decision 
of 2007. But in accordance with the DP’s District Council electoral pro-
posal, major political parties, which will be able to win signifi cant num-
bers of elected District Council seats, will be able to nominate their Dis-
trict Councillors for election by the populace. Ordinary people in Hong 
Kong will therefore be able to vote for political parties of their choice, 
not only in the fi ve newly created seats elected directly by universal suf-
frage, but also in the other fi ve newly created seats of the District Coun-
cils functional constituency. The percentage of LegCo seats elected by 
Article_4.indd   266 9/16/2010   5:53:22 PM
Vol 40 Part 2 An Unexpected Breakthrough 267
universal suffrage or quasi- universal suffrage (in the case of the District 
Councils constituency) will thus increase from 50 per cent (in the exist-
ing system) to 57 per cent. It cannot be denied that this is a step forward 
in terms of the democratisation of the HKSAR. 
Politics is, in the fi nal analysis, the art of the possible. Since the 
HKSAR Government put forward the Reform Package in April 2010 
which was met by the pan-democrats’ opposition, it seemed that the 
scenario of the pan-democrats vetoing the Government’s constitutional 
reform proposal in December 2005 was likely to repeat itself. Break-
ing the deadlock was no easy task. This time the “moderate” democrats 
adopted the innovative strategy of seeking to establish a dialogue with 
Beijing. In agreeing to meet with them, Beijing made a major policy shift 
with regard to its relationship with the pan-democrats in Hong Kong, 
who had for a long time been viewed as anti-Beijing and opposing what-
ever Beijing said. 
Yet, when the DP fi rst met with Mr Li Gang of the Liaison Offi ce on 
24 May 2010, their positions seemed to be poles apart. For example, the 
DP sought assurance from Beijing that there would in 2017 and 2020 be 
genuine universal suffrage for the election of the CE and all legislators 
respectively, in the sense of a low nomination “threshold” for candidates 
for the CE election and the abolition of all functional constituencies. 
They also demanded an undertaking from Beijing that the proportion 
of seats directly elected by universal suffrage would be increased in the 
LegCo of 2016, and the separate voting mechanism should be abolished 
at that time.21 From Beijing’s point of view, questions of what precise 
electoral models will be adopted in 2016, 2017 and 2010 can only 
be settled in accordance with the fi ve-step procedure stipulated in the 
NPCSC Interpretation of 2004.22 The fi ve-step procedure may only be 
initiated near the time of the relevant elections. Apart from this legal 
consideration, there is also the political reality that in order to settle 
these questions, discussion in Hong Kong among various political forces 
and in civil society would be necessary. Such discussion is expected to be 
lengthy and can take place only in future, after the Reform Package for 
2012 has been dealt with. 
Another principal demand put forward by the DP at its meeting with 
Mr Li was the DP’s District Council electoral proposal. Mr Li questioned 
whether the proposal was consistent with the NPCSC Decision of 2007 
regarding the ratio of functionally elected and directly elected legislators 
21 See Annex 4 to the Democratic Party’s Report mentioned in n 6 above. 
22 See n 11, above. 
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in 2012.23 In my view, there was indeed a genuine legal question regard-
ing the compatibility of the proposal with the NPCSC Decision.24 The 
proposal was, as acknowledged subsequently by leading members of the 
DP, a form of de facto or quasi direct election. It was most probably outside 
the contemplation of the NPCSC when making the Decision of 2007 
that “election by functional constituencies” could mean the kind of elec-
tion in the DP’s District Council electoral proposal. 
It may thus be seen that the ultimate passage of the Government’s 
Reform Package as modifi ed by the DP’s proposal was the result of a com-
promise in which both Beijing and the HKSAR Government on the one 
hand and the DP made major concessions. It was a classic instance of 
bargaining and give-and-take in order to make a deal. Both sides would 
like to see Hong Kong go one step forward in its constitutional reform 
and democratisation and therefore had the incentive to engage and 
cooperate with each other. The DP ultimately recognised that for both 
legal and political reasons, it was impossible to extract from Beijing any 
meaningful undertakings regarding the precise electoral models for the 
CE and LegCo after 2012. Thus it was more viable to focus on how the 
Reform Package for 2012 could be improved in terms of its democratic 
elements. The HKSAR Government had a strong incentive in secur-
ing the passage of the constitutional reform proposal, as its defeat would 
probably aggravate the lack of popularity and governance crisis which 
the Government already faced. Beijing probably understood the desper-
ate need to bolster the authority of the HKSAR Government by secur-
ing the passage of the constitutional reform proposal. Having initiated 
the dialogue with the “moderate” democrats, it probably also understood 
23 See the DP Report mentioned in n 6 above, para 12. The Report disclosed that when DP leaders 
met with Chief Executive Donald Tsang on 7 June 2010, Mr Tsang told them that he had rec-
ommended the DP’s District Council electoral proposal to the Beijing authorities three times 
but without success (see p 27 of the Report). DP Chairman Mr Albert Ho also disclosed that 
he had met with Mr Tsang several times to discuss the Government’s political reform package, 
and Tsang told him every time that the DP’s proposal was contrary to the NPCSC Decision: see 
“Democratic Party praises Elsie Leung for her contribution to the political reform” (民主黨讚
梁愛詩政改功臣), Ming Pao (明報), 9 July 2010, p A6.
24 In an interview with Ta Kung Pao (大公報) published on 10 June 2010 (p A6) (“Albert 
Chen: The Opposition’s proposal is diffi cult to implement” (陳弘毅：反對派方案難實現), 
I expressed the view that the proposal would probably be considered inconsistent with the 
NPCSC Decision, as the proposed mode of election was much closer to direct elections than 
to functional constituency elections. That view was based on the traditional understanding 
of functional constituencies as being for the purpose of the representation of the interests of a 
particular trade, occupation, profession, or sector, and the traditional principle that the LegCo 
member(s) elected by a functional constituency (such as the District Councils functional con-
stituency established since 1999) should be nominated and elected by members of that func-
tional constituency (and not elected by persons outside that functional constituency). For legal 
aspects of functional constituencies, see, eg the recent case of Chan Yu Nam v Secretary for 
Justice [2010] 1 HKC 493. For further discussion, see n 18 above.
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that the failure of the dialogue (in achieving anything positive in terms 
of constitutional reform) would lead to the “moderate” democrats being 
sidelined and the “radical” democrats – those who engineered the “ref-
erendum” which had upset Beijing so much –  taking over leadership of 
the pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong. Thus Beijing ultimately chose 
to adopt a fl exible and creative interpretation of the NPCSC Decision 
of 2007 (instead of one sticking to its original intention) in giving its 
blessings to the HKSAR Government’s Reform Package as modifi ed by 
the DP’s proposal. 
The DP was vehemently attacked by some radical democrats, par-
ticularly those in the LSD, for supporting the modifi ed Reform Package. 
The developments of June 2010 are expected to change signifi cantly 
the political landscape of Hong Kong. As suggested by a recent survey,25 
a reshuffl ing of voters’ allegiance is under way. The DP has lost the 
support of some of its previous voters, but has gained the support of 
some others who previously voted for other pro-democracy parties or for 
pro-establishment parties. Corresponding changes in voters’ allegiance 
have been detected with regard to other political parties in Hong Kong. 
It is possible that the traditional landscape of pro-establishment forces 
versus pro-democracy forces (gaining 40 per cent and 60 per cent of 
the popular votes respectively)26 will give way to a threefold division 
of pro-establishment forces, the “moderate” democrats (led by the DP) 
and the “radical” democrats (led by the CP and LSD). 
The process of the constitutional reform of 2010 underscores the 
increasing involvement of Beijing in Hong Kong politics. However, a 
distinction should be drawn here between “ordinary politics” and “con-
stitutional politics”. In the case of the former, Beijing has so far respected 
the autonomy of the HKSAR Government in decision-making on social, 
economic and other policies in Hong Kong’s domestic affairs in accor-
dance with the Basic Law. But as far as “constitutional politics” is con-
cerned, the NPCSC Interpretation of 2004 and the fi ve-step procedure it 
specifi ed for constitutional reform27 inevitably result in Beijing’s involve-
ment in decision-making on constitutional change in Hong Kong. The 
autonomy which the Basic Law confers on the HKSAR Government is 
autonomy to govern Hong Kong in accordance with the political sys-
tem specifi ed in the Basic Law. But changes to the political system itself 
are not entirely within Hong Kong’s autonomy; the precise roles of the 
25 “Support for the Democratic Party remains unchanged, the Civic Party gains more support” 
(民主黨支持度不變，公民黨支持度勁升), Ming Pao (明報), 28 June 2010. 
26 See generally Albert H. Y. Chen, “The Basic Law and the Development of the Political System 
in Hong Kong” (2007) 15 Asia Pacifi c Law Review 19.
27 See n 11 above. 
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HKSAR Government, the Hong Kong LegCo and Beijing in the process 
of constitutional reform are specifi ed in the Basic Law and the NPCSC 
Interpretation of 2004. In the particular case of the constitutional reform 
of 2010, it was logical for the moderate democrats in Hong Kong to dis-
cuss with Beijing matters such as the road map and models for universal 
suffrage after 2012, as the HKSAR Government had made it clear that it 
had not been authorised to deal with these matters.28 Similarly, the cru-
cial question of whether the DP’s District Council electoral proposal was 
inconsistent with the NPCSC Decision of 2007 was a question which 
only Beijing could conclusively determine. 
The momentous events of June 2010 marked not only a breakthrough 
in constitutional reform in Hong Kong, but also a breakthrough in the 
relationship between Beijing and the pro-democracy forces in Hong 
Kong. Since 1989, the poor relationship and lack of trust between the 
two sides has been, in this author’s opinion, the biggest single stumbling 
block to Hong Kong’s democratisation.29 But now, in achieving the con-
stitutional reform of June 2010, Beijing and the moderate wing of the 
pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong led by the DP have engaged in a 
dialogue and a process of give-and-take which, coupled with the positive 
intermediary role played by the HKSAR Government, have proved to 
be useful and constructive. The future democratisation of the HKSAR 
depends not only on the existence of a HKSAR Government with pro-
democracy inclinations, but also on further interaction and coopera-
tion between the moderate and pragmatic elements in both the Beijing 
Government and pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong. For this, a good 
foundation has been laid, a useful precedent established, and a minimum 
amount of mutual trust and good will secured, by the “miracle”30 of the 
constitutional reform of June 2010. 
28 See paras 1.28–1.29 of the Consultation Document referred to in the fi rst paragraph of this article, 
and paras 5.05–5.06 of the Package of Proposals referred to in the second paragraph of this 
article.  
29 See the work cited in note 26 above.  
30 It was widely believed in early June that unless a “miracle” happened, the Government’s Reform 
Package would be vetoed by LegCo in June 2010. 
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